Crimes not committed by people removed
Three in ten people in immigration detention have a criminal conviction, and removing them takes them out of the population that might offend again. Whether large-scale interior enforcement actually lowers crime has been measured. It did not.
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Value
The stream is offences that do not happen: assaults, burglaries, thefts and the smaller number of serious violent crimes behind them. This site places safety from crime in the same class as life and health, one step below the top of it here because the great majority of what is prevented is property crime and lesser assault rather than killing. The people spared are not identified in advance, which is normal for a stream of this kind and does not lower its weight. What is counted is the harm to victims, not the cost of policing or of prisons, which sits elsewhere. The value is high because the stream is safety from harm by other people, set one step below the maximum because most of what is prevented is not violence against the person.
Impact
The buildout raises removals by roughly 350,000 a year above the level of 2024. About three in ten people in immigration detention have a criminal conviction, which gives 103,000 people a year with a record among those removed [2]. Not all of them would offend again: a reoffending rate of 15 percent a year is used here, in a range from 5 to 30 percent, which is at or below what is observed for released populations generally. That gives about 15,000 offences a year that do not happen. The average harm to victims across the mix of offences involved — mostly property crime, drug offences and lesser assault — is put at 15,000 euro, in a range from 5,000 to 40,000. The result is 232 million euro a year. This is what the mechanism would deliver if it worked as described; whether it does is the subject of the next paragraph. The Impact is modest even taken at face value, because the share of those removed with any criminal record is under a third and most of their offending is not violent.
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| Removals a year above the 2024 level [1] | 350,000 people a year | ||
| × | Share with a criminal conviction seven in ten people in immigration detention have no conviction [2] | 29.4 % | 103,000 people a year |
| × | Offences that would have followed in a year Setting, range 5 to 30 percent: at or below observed reoffending for released populations generally | 15 % | 15,450 offences a year |
| × | Average harm to victims Setting, range 5,000 to 40,000 euro: mostly property crime, drug offences and lesser assault | 15,000 euro each | 232 million euro |
| ÷ | Normalised Impact scale of this evaluation | 2 billion euro a point | 0.12 |
Plausibility
This claim has been tested at national scale and the test found nothing. Secure Communities checked the immigration status of everyone arrested by local police and was rolled out county by county between 2008 and 2013, which lets the counties that got it early be compared against those that got it late [3]. Across that comparison the programme had no observable effect on rates of homicide, rape, robbery or aggravated assault. The confounder that would otherwise dominate — that counties adopting early differ from those adopting late — is what the staggered rollout is designed to absorb, and reverse causation cannot arise because the order of adoption was set administratively rather than by local crime rates. The usual reply is that Secure Communities screened arrestees while the current buildout removes people who have already been convicted, which is a real difference and is why this argument is not scored at zero. But it is a difference in target, not in mechanism, and the mechanism is what failed the test. The Plausibility is low because a close twin of this measure ran across the whole country and the effect it is supposed to produce did not appear.
Counterfactual: counties that received Secure Communities later, compared against those that received it earlier. Design: quasi-experimental — difference-in-differences on a staggered administrative rollout (Cox and Miles, Journal of Law and Economics 2014 [3]). Confounder: early-adopting counties differing from late ones, absorbed by the staggered design. Direction: no reverse causation, adoption order was set administratively rather than by local crime rates. Ceiling: quasi-experimental 8.0 binds below the praezedenz ceiling of 8.5; the band binds far below it. Band: effect did not materialise — a close twin ran nationally and the crime effect did not appear.
Secure Communities ran across the country under a design that can measure it, and produced no observable change in violent crime rates [3]. Read back: roughly one time in five, an interior enforcement programme of this size lowers crime by about the amount assumed here; the rest of the time it does not.
Open: The current buildout is itself staggered across states and sectors. A comparison of crime rates in areas where removals rose earliest against those where they rose latest would settle it within two years and could carry P to 6, or take the argument out of the ledger.